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Abstract
By taking the vantage point of agonistic pluralism, the aim is to enter into dialogue with Samuelsson’s 
theoretical development of consensus as an educational aim for classroom discussions. The response 
highlights three points of interest in the deliberative conception of consensus. The first point relates  
to the problem of exclusion, which Samuelsson clearly framed as something that concerns delibera-
tive theory and agonistic theory. The second point is about the relation between conflict and consen-
sus and the kind of conflict that is compatible with Samuelsson’s idea of consensus. The concluding 
part of this response is an exploration of how the agonistic concept of hegemony could function as an 
alternative aim for ending classroom discussions.
This article is in response to
Samuelsson, M. (2018). Education for deliberative democracy and the aim of consensus. Democracy 
and Education, 26(1), Article 2.
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Introduction
In his article “Education for Deliberative Democracy and the Aim of Consensus,” Samuelsson (2018) further developed deliberative theory in relation to educational 
questions. Samuelsson’s article could be considered one of a series, 
in which he developed and improved deliberation as an educational 
theory (see Samuelsson, 2013, 2016; Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015).  
In the article, he theoretically developed a cornerstone of delibera-
tive theory, namely the aim for consensus. This clear focus on the 
main concept in deliberative theory is a very welcome contribution 
to the current debate on democratic education and, as I see it, to the 
ongoing discussion between deliberative and agonistic scholars.1
1 Samuelsson (2018) used the term radical pluralist to describe Chantal 
Mouffe’s position in relation to deliberative theory (p. 2). I have chosen to 
use the term agonism/agonistic scholars instead of radical pluralism/radical 
Samuelsson’s (2018) article touched upon one of the main 
questions that democratic education needs to handle: What should 
characterize political discussions in the classroom? For instance, 
should classroom discussions focus mainly on rational arguments, 
pluralists to describe Mouffe’s position and the educational perspective that 
is based on Mouffe’s theory. Without getting into a conceptual discussion 
about agonism and radical pluralism (or the concept of radical democ-
racy), I consequently use the term agonism, as it frames the arguments in 
this article within the ongoing educational debate about deliberative theory 
and agonism (see, for example, Englund, 2016; Ljunggren, 2007; Lo, 2017; 
Ruitenberg, 2009; Thomas- Reid, 2018; Zembylas, 2018).
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or should they be open to emotions and identities? When teachers 
plan for a discussion in the classroom, they can have different aims 
or ideas as to how they want that discussion to end. Consensus 
constitutes one such aim, and it can be one way to end a discussion.
As Samuelsson (2018) pointed out, the aim for consensus 
cannot be transferred undistorted from political theories to 
teaching and classroom discussions. As a classroom is not a 
parliament or a political party, the question of what the aim for 
consensus can (and should) mean in a classroom cannot be 
answered solely by political theory. Since it is an educational issue, 
it requires educational answers (cf. Hess & McAvoy, 2015). By 
drawing on empirical examples, Samuelsson highlighted how 
classroom discussions could aim for different kinds of consensus. 
For instance, students can reach a consensus on what food they 
should serve at their party but still disagree on why they should 
serve that food. They do not have to reach a consensus on both 
what to serve and why to serve it in order to reach a decision that 
they all can agree to. In a broader sense, this means that the kind of 
consensus that is suitable for a classroom may not be the same kind 
of consensus that is appropriate for other political discussions. This 
theoretical clarification of what the aim for consensus means in 
education gives new insights into what could be considered a 
desirable way of ending classroom discussions.
In this response to Samuelsson’s (2018) article, I would like to 
highlight two main questions facing deliberative theory, both of 
which are accentuated by Samuelsson’s article. The first is the 
question of exclusion: How can deliberative theory account for and 
deal with what is outside consensus? If the aim of classroom 
discussions is to reach consensus in difficult and burning political 
issues, it is crucial to highlight what is outside consensus and why 
certain positions are excluded.
The second question concerns the notion of conflict. Samuels-
son (2018) set out to explore and formulate a notion of consensus 
that takes conflict seriously. What I want to highlight is the need 
for a discussion about what kind of phenomenon conflict is. If the 
aim of classroom discussions is to reach a consensus that is 
compatible with conflicts, we need to specify what we mean by 
conflict by asking: Which conflicts between students are com-
patible with the aim for consensus?
I end my response by turning to the agonistic notion of 
hegemony and briefly elaborate on how hegemony could be 
considered an alternative to Samuelsson’s (2018) idea of consensus 
as an educational aim for ending classroom discussions.
What Are the Grounds for Exclusion?
Samuelsson (2018) pointed to how the aim for consensus has been 
criticized within educational theory. The critique from agonistic/
radical democratic scholars has pointed out that the aim for 
consensus can suppress and exclude the political positions and 
opinions of those who are not in power and, in that way, reaffirm 
those with power. For example, in a classroom discussion, this 
could mean that the popular students will be the ones that implic-
itly decide “what we all agree to.” With this said, criticizing the  
aim of consensus from an agonistic perspective is nothing new,  
this critique has been a part of the ongoing discussion between 
deliberative and agonistic scholars (Samuelsson, 2018,  
pp. 2– 3, 5).
When discussing the aim of consensus, the question of 
exclusion is accentuated. Drawing on the field of political theory, 
Samuelsson (2018) rightly pointed out that there must be some 
form of exclusion; otherwise we would end up with a situation in 
which anything goes and “any substantive position would be 
worthy of the respect of others” (p. 5). Given the ongoing develop-
ment of misogynistic and racist politics that are becoming an 
unquestioned part of the public debate, at least in Europe, Samuels-
son was right in saying that political life depends on some form of 
exclusion. In that sense, the question of exclusion is not a problem 
that is specific to deliberative theory but rather to democratic 
theory as such, and therefore also a problem for agonistic plural-
ism. “Thus, it is not only deliberative democracy and its ideal of 
consensus that excludes certain types of citizens, behavior, and 
positions from democratic participation” (p. 5). Given this account, 
we can see that the question of exclusion in political discussions is 
something that concerns both deliberative and agonistic scholars. 
A main question is then: On what grounds should certain positions 
be excluded from democratic participation? In a classroom 
discussion in which the aim is to reach consensus, the crucial 
question is: What are the grounds for excluding certain positions 
from a classroom discussion and, moreover, are these grounds 
themselves open for discussion? As I see it, it is in answering these 
questions that deliberative theory becomes problematic.
Here, at least two answers are available for deliberative theory. 
The first would be to ground consensus in rationality. In this way, a 
rational and strong argument would be what brings students 
toward a consensus. Seeing rationality as the basis for consensus 
would also mean that it is the students’ arguments and claims that 
are at stake in the classroom, rather than their identities.
The agonistic critique of this notion of rationality is that 
grounding exclusion in the idea of a “neutral” rationality is never a 
neutral act but always a political act that draws a line between those 
who are considered legitimate participants and those who are 
considered illegitimate. In short, the agonistic critique points to 
how the idea of rationality conceals the political and contingent 
aspects of exclusion, that is, there is no external natural law that 
constitutes the boundary between the legitimate and illegitimate 
participant (Mouffe, 2005, p. 121). If the act of excluding certain 
positions is concealed as being a political decision, it means that 
students are not given any opportunity to discuss the exclusion. 
From an agonistic perspective, it can be considered crucial that the 
teacher highlights how and why exclusion is a political decision 
and how the boundaries of consensus never can be immune from 
contestation (see Mouffe, 2005, p. 56). Thus, the problem with 
grounding consensus in rationality is that it limits the opportuni-
ties for students to discuss what is excluded and why certain 
positions should be excluded. As I see it, the importance of framing 
exclusion as a political decision is not primarily about philosophi-
cal arguments, but about the educational possibilities that such 
discussions can bring about. If the boundaries of consensus are 
already set by rationality before the classroom discussion begins, 
the potential outcomes of the discussion will be curtailed.
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The second answer is to ground consensus in essentialism. 
However, this would seem to rub against the nerve of deliberative 
democracy and, in a broader sense, liberal democracy. Grounding 
consensus in essentialism would imply that the boundaries 
between those who participate in the deliberations and those who 
are excluded stem from a conception about who the others are. 
Such essentialism could easily become a pathway for racist or 
misogynistic ideas about essential differences between students 
and would therefore not be a real alternative for deliberative theory 
or for democratic education as such.
The agonistic answer to the question is that exclusion should be 
politically grounded. This means that the boundary between “us” and 
“them” should be based on the differences between what we and they 
want, not ideas about who we or the others essentially are (Mouffe, 
2005). Moreover, from an agonistic perspective, students should be 
given the opportunity to form collective identities based on what 
they (politically) want, regardless of their prescribed identities 
(Zembylas, 2011). When it comes to democratic participation, the 
political boundary is between those who adhere to the key values of 
democracy (equality and liberty) and those who do not. This is the 
idea of “conflictual consensus,” which means:
. . . consensus on the ethico- political values of liberty and equality of 
all, dissent about their interpretation. A line should therefore be 
drawn between those who reject those values outright and those who, 
while accepting them, fight for conflicting interpretations. (Mouffe, 
2005, p. 121)
Establishing such a consensus is never about a rational all- inclusive 
consensus, but from an agonistic perspective is about establishing a 
hegemony, in this case the establishment of liberty and equality  
for all as hegemonic values (Gürsözlü, 2009). This means that  
the justification of these values is not located before or outside the 
discussion itself (Sund & Öhman, 2014). However, what is impor-
tant to bear in mind is that given this agonistic perspective, 
classroom discussions about controversial and political issues 
would not mean opening up for “anything goes” or an approach 
where “any substantive position would be worthy of the respect of 
others” (Samuelsson, 2018, p. 5). What it does mean is that the 
conflictual consensus and its boundaries would be grounded in  
the students’ political act of articulating exclusions and establish-
ing values as hegemonic. Within the scope of democratic educa-
tion, the goal would be for students to establish liberty and equality 
as hegemonic values— not because they would find them most 
rational but because they would find them most desirable. Placing 
desire and will in the foreground, instead of rationality, would also 
have consequences when it comes to concrete classroom discus-
sions. Imagine that students discuss whether it is right to join a 
climate strike. In this case, what would bring (some) students 
together in a will- formation would perhaps not be the rational 
arguments but could be their joint desire, values, and sense of 
identity. As this issue is inseparable from students’ hope and fear of 
the future, a valid argument would not only revolve around what is 
most rational to do but could also be about what they want to do 
and what they want to achieve. Thus, the very things that make the 
issue a burning political issue in the first place, things such as 
desire, value, and identity, would not be left out of the discussion. 
The boundaries between “us” and “them” would in this sense be 
based on what the students want, and the political identities that 
can take form out of their collective will (see Mouffe, 2005; see also 
Ljunggren, 2008; Zembylas, 2011).
In line with Samuelsson (2018), I agree that the question of 
exclusion is a crucial one for democratic education. However, I find 
it difficult to see what answer deliberative theory can provide us 
with when it comes to the grounds on which exclusion should be 
made. Would it, for instance, be possible from a deliberative point 
of view to argue that exclusions in a classroom discussion should 
be politically grounded? If so, would this be compatible with the 
deliberative idea of consensus? As I see it, the question of exclusion 
is important, and the answers that deliberative theory can provide 
are imperative for understanding what the aim for consensus 
means in classroom discussions.
I now turn to the second main point in my response to 
Samuelsson’s (2018) article: the conception of conflict in relation  
to consensus.
What Is a Conflict?
In exploring different notions of consensus, Samuelsson (2018) 
raised a crucial question: “how to formulate a notion of consensus 
that takes pluralism, dissensus, and disagreement seriously” (p. 6). 
This relates to the critique that has been directed toward 
deliberative theory from an agonistic perspective. In short, the 
critique has highlighted how the aim of consensus overlooks the 
conflictual dimension of political life (see, for example, Ruitenberg, 
2009). Samuelsson’s outline provides an answer to how different 
notions of consensus relate to pluralism, dissensus and disagree-
ment. He illustrated how consensus is “a multifaceted concept that, 
on its own, will not eliminate all possibilities for disagreement” 
(p. 7). Moreover, by making a distinction between preference 
consensus and normative consensus, he showed how students  
can reach agreement in one form, while at the same time failing to 
reach it in another. Students can reach a preference consensus, 
meaning that they agree on what to do and still fail to reach a 
normative consensus by disagreeing on why they should that. An 
illustrative example of this is if students all agree to serve pizza at 
their party. In that sense, they have reached a preference consensus 
on what to do. However, they can support the decision to serve 
pizza for different reasons, meaning that they disagree on why to do 
that (p. 6). With this distinction in the foreground, Samuelsson 
argued that going for preference consensus might be a suitable 
educational aim: “[I]n a deliberative educative sense, it might be 
more suitable to strive for a preference consensus because that 
would allow students to practice the type of consensus deliberative 
democracy is most interested in reaching” (p. 7). Aiming for this 
form of consensus means that it is not the students’ values or 
deeply embedded emotions that are at stake in the discussion, but 
rather the more practical question of what to do.
Given this distinction, we could ask if this setup of agreement/
disagreement really is a notion of consensus that takes conflict 
seriously. We could argue that the question what to do qualitatively 
differs from the question why do that. In that sense, there is nothing 
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special about students agreeing on one issue and disagreeing on 
another. As I understand it, disagreement on these two different 
questions does not necessarily imply a notion of consensus that is 
compatible with conflict. I am not claiming that the aim for 
consensus in classroom discussions should mean that students 
need to agree on what to do and why to do it. What I want to point 
to is that it is difficult to grasp what aiming for consensus and at the 
same time taking “pluralism, dissensus, and disagreement seri-
ously” would mean in practical terms in a classroom discussion 
(see Samuelsson, 2018, p. 6.)
Furthermore, what needs to be highlighted here is that not 
only are there different notions of consensus but also there are 
different notions of conflict. So, in addition to Samuelsson’s (2018) 
question about which notions of consensus take conflict seriously, 
we also need to ask: Which notions of conflict are compatible  
with the deliberative idea of consensus?
I have elsewhere argued that deliberative and agonistic theories 
seem to have profoundly different conceptions of what a conflict is. 
In short, deliberative theory draws on an ontic understanding of 
conflict, while agonism draws on an ontological understanding  
of conflict (Tryggvason, 2018a). Without going into a conceptual 
discussion about this, my point here is to link Samuelsson’s (2018) 
question about consensus with a question of what a conflict is.
Imagine a teacher planning for a political discussion. If the aim 
of that discussion is that the students should reach some form of 
consensus, then it would be reasonable to say that such an aim would 
rely both on an understanding of what consensus is and some idea of 
what a conflict is— whether that idea is made explicit or not. So, if 
Samuelsson (2018) is right, in that preference consensus is a suitable 
aim for classroom discussions, we also need to ask what kind of 
conflicts can (and cannot) be overcome by this consensus.
Aiming for Hegemony Instead of Consensus
By way of conclusion, I would like to turn to Samuelsson’s call: 
“[T]here has to be more to democracy than purely disagreement, 
confrontation and disruption” (Samuelsson, 2018, p. 5). In this he is 
absolutely right. Democracy needs sedimentation and stability. 
Conflict needs to be resolved and decisions need to be made. 
Perhaps the answer is not consensus, but hegemony?
The concept hegemony has some troubling connotations, 
especially in relation to democratic education. In daily use it can 
mean the dominance of one position or ideology over others. In 
that sense, a hegemonic relation is always an asymmetric power 
relation. Bringing hegemony into the discussion of democratic 
education therefore requires both a critical discussion as well as 
careful considerations. Given this, my outline here should be 
understood as a tentative elaboration on how hegemony could 
function as an alternative to consensus in classroom discussions. 
The notion of hegemony that I draw on has its roots in Laclau  
and Mouffe’s (1985/2001) theoretical work, which is closely related 
to Mouffe’s (2005) agonistic theory. As with its daily use, hegemony 
is within Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical framework a concept  
that is about asymmetric power relations.
When bringing hegemony into the discussion of democratic 
education, it needs to be thought of as an empty container. What 
becomes important is not the fact that something is hegemonic but 
rather the question: What is hegemonic, and is it compatible with 
democratic education? (For a similar, formalistic, way to use 
populism in relation to democratic education, see Mårdh & 
Tryggvason, 2017.) The fact that something is hegemonic does not 
necessarily mean that it is bad or undesirable. For instance, the 
hegemony of liberal democracy over fascism in European politics 
is a dominance and an asymmetric power relation that is worth 
defending. In democratic education the values of democracy are 
hegemonic, that is, democratic education aims at reproducing 
democratic life and carries the hope that the students will cherish 
liberty and equality. As these values are hegemonic in democratic 
education it means that actions and arguments that go against 
them will not pass unnoticed or without discussion.
So, what could this mean in practice when students discuss an 
issue in the classroom? Let us return to the case of students discuss-
ing whether it is right to join a climate strike. The students argue 
back and forth and shape both their arguments and opinions while 
discussing with each other. We then imagine that one opinion takes 
the higher ground in the discussion, for example, the opinion that it 
is wrong for students to join the climate strike. As this opinion 
becomes hegemonic, it establishes an asymmetric power relation to 
other opinions. Students arguing against it would experience that 
they were struggling against the stream and that their own argu-
ments were coming out on the losing end. What should the teacher 
do in a situation like this? From a deliberative perspective, the 
teacher should encourage the students to reach a consensus. This 
means that the goal for the teacher would be that all students agree 
on whether it is right to join the climate strike. In contrast, from an 
agonistic perspective, it would be considered valuable, both 
democratically and educationally, that students are able to reach a 
closure in the discussion even if they do not agree with one another. 
The teacher could, for example, end the discussion by summarizing 
the different positions and make visible what opinion became 
hegemonic in the discussion (cf. Sund & Öhman, 2014, pp. 651– 652).
In this sense, making the hegemony of one opinion visible 
could be a way to end the discussion and reach a temporary 
closure. What becomes crucial is not only that the hegemonic 
opinion is visible, but also that it is compatible with democracy  
and the values of liberty and equality (see Mouffe, 2005, 
pp. 121– 122). The aim would not be that all students agree with each 
other but rather that they all can come to terms with the outcome 
of the discussion.
Furthermore, aiming for hegemony would mean that the 
teacher aims at enabling clashing opinions to be maintained as 
political positions. As political positions, it would mean that the 
lines between “us” and “them” that are drawn in classroom 
discussions would be based on diverging opinions, rather than 
essentialist notions of “us” and “them” (Mouffe, 2005). When the 
boundary between us/them is based on diverging opinions it 
implies that individual students can cross the boundary as soon as 
they change their minds. For instance, students can change their 
minds about whether it is right to join the climate strike or not, but 
that does not mean that the different positions should collapse into 
each in the name of consensus (see Lo, 2017). This is of course 
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easier said than done, as opinions that are truly political are also 
unavoidably entangled with both emotions and identities  
(Zembylas, 2009). This idea of hegemony means that the forma-
tion of an “us” is a position that is not open to every opinion but is 
open to all students to enter into if they change their minds. As 
hegemony is a concept that draws on an understanding of conflict 
as an ontological phenomenon, we could say that hegemony ends 
the discussion but not the conflict (Tryggvason, 2018b).
It is important to underscore that this should not be understood 
in terms of being a closure where students simply “agree to disagree.” 
The notion of hegemony comes with a stronger claim. As described 
before, establishing a hegemony as a way to end a classroom 
discussion would imply that some position(s) will become hege-
monic; some students will experience that their opinion takes the 
higher ground in the discussion, whereas other students will 
experience the opposite. As I see it, it could be considered education-
ally valuable that students get to experience both what it means to 
win and what it means to lose democratic conflicts. Furthermore, as 
a classroom discussion is a staged setting, one that is planned by the 
teacher and is also based on the teacher’s consideration and knowl-
edge about the students, it is perhaps the best place for young people 
to experience both sides of democracy.
In relation to this, I think that the need for closure in classroom 
discussions cannot be overemphasized. Hess and McAvoy (2015) 
have pointed out that classrooms are “unusual political spaces,” in 
that students are practically stuck with each other even after leaving 
the classroom. For example, they go to other classes together and 
sometimes even spend many years together in constellations over 
which they have no power (p. 6). Reaching a closure in heated 
discussions therefore seems to be extremely important in class-
rooms. Hegemony can here be one educational ideal for reaching a 
closure in heated discussions without aiming for consensus.
To conclude, Samuelsson’s (2018) article brings new thoughts 
and perspectives to deliberative theory and to the scholarly debate 
about deliberation and agonism as educational ideals. His develop-
ment of what the aim for consensus means in the classroom 
provides insights into both the merits and problems with consen-
sus as an educational ideal. The proposal of hegemony that I put 
forward in this response is an idea of how to end discussions. 
However, when it comes to the ongoing discussion between 
scholars advocating deliberation and those advocating agonism, 
there seems to be no closure within reach. On the contrary,  
the discussion is as vital as ever. Given the characteristics of 
political discussions in the media and in the public sphere,  
the question of how students should discuss political issues in the 
classroom is perhaps more important than ever before. As an 
“unusual political space,” the classroom can provide students with 
experiences of political discussions that some may not encounter 
elsewhere. With this in mind, the ongoing debate about delibera-
tion and agonism, to which Samuelsson’s article makes an impor-
tant contribution, is crucial for both democracy and education.
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